Collapsing Economic Case and Government Avoiding Oversight and Scrutiny
A lot has happened since our last update. We’ve been busy with freedom of information requests and we’ve exposed how the Government is trying to avoid accountability for this disastrous road scheme.
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We have launched a new letter writing campaign sending pre-written letters to decision makers.
The A38 expansion will destroy woodland, worsen air quality, increase carbon emissions, and cause years of construction chaos, yet the economic case used to justify all that harm is falling apart. Costs have tripled, the scheme's own documents predict it will increase traffic rather than reduce congestion, and no alternatives have ever been considered.
Please write today to demand independent scrutiny of this scheme and a proper study of sustainable transport alternatives for Derby.
Every letter sent adds pressure.
Write and share today: https://actionnetwork.org/letters/a38-expansion-a-harmful-road-scheme-with-a-collapsing-economic-case-write-to-decision-makers
WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE OUR LAST UPDATE
We wrote to the National Audit Office
The campaign has formally asked Parliament's independent spending watchdog to investigate whether public money is being spent responsibly on this scheme.
We forced the costs into the open — but National Highways tried to justify the secrecy
National Highways tried to hide their own cost figures by refusing an FOI request. They lost an Information Commissioner's ruling in December 2025, appealed it, then withdrew in April 2026. They subsequently claimed the original decision to withhold was correct — pointing to a February 2026 market engagement notice as justification for commercial sensitivity.
But the cost figures were already publicly available in the independent regulator's own monitoring data from July 2025 — seven months before that notice was issued. The figures they tried to conceal show they submitted a cost of £590 million and a benefit-cost ratio of just 1.1 to the government during the 2024 Spending Review.
ICO Decision Notice: https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/decision-notices/2025/12/ic-438853-p5q9/
ORR cost monitoring data (July 2025): https://www.orr.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2025-08/annual-assessment-of-national-highways-performance-2024-2025-web.pdf
But the DfT is still hiding information
The government cancelled Midlands Mainline Electrification in the same spending review that approved the A38 — claiming the railway was lower value for money. Yet the DfT refuses to release the information that supposedly justified that comparison. The public cannot scrutinise a decision they are not allowed to see.
The government removed independent oversight
In March 2026 the government raised the qualifying threshold for mandatory independent scrutiny of major projects from £500 million to £1 billion — quietly removing the A38 from the oversight framework at the moment its costs were rising.
Projects below £1 billion no longer automatically receive independent scrutiny from the Government Major Projects Portfolio. We asked if a basic spending accountability check — called an Accounting Officer Assessment, a standard Treasury requirement for large or unusual projects — would be carried out instead.
The DfT confirmed in writing: no check has been initiated and no correspondence with the Treasury about one exists.
GMPP threshold change: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-major-projects-portfolio
The promised business case still does not exist
A Full Business Case is the standard document that sets out the economic justification for a major infrastructure project and must be completed before construction funds are formally committed. National Highways told us in a Freedom of Information response that it would be ready by June 2026.
But no contractor has been appointed and no tender has been issued — a business case cannot be completed without knowing the final construction cost.
New evidence: this scheme will make local traffic worse
Official planning documents show Derby City Council asked National Highways to consider mitigation for predicted traffic increases on local roads caused by the scheme. National Highways' response, recorded in the Statement of Common Ground: the worsening of local roads is "an inevitable effect" of the scheme and funding the consequences is Derby City Council's problem, not theirs. This scheme does not solve congestion. It moves it.
Statement of Common Ground (page 52): https://nsip-documents.planninginspectorate.gov.uk/published-documents/TR010022-000841-TR010022_A38_8.7_SoCG_Derby_City_Council.pdf
Derby City Council Local Highway Impact Report: https://nsip-documents.planninginspectorate.gov.uk/published-documents/TR010022-000814-DCiC%20LHIR.pdf
The housing numbers keep growing — but the traffic modelling has not
When the A38 expansion was approved, it was justified on the basis of unlocking a minimum of 11,000 homes. That figure has since grown to 43,000 in Road Investment Strategy 3 communications — nearly four times higher. The traffic modelling has not been updated since 2019 and was never designed for housing numbers anywhere near this scale. Derby City Council's own analysis warns the original models are no longer reliable. Nobody has assessed what 43,000 homes actually means for Derby's roads — and National Highways has already told the Council that any resulting traffic problems are their problem to deal with, not National Highways'.
A38 “Improvements” around Ashfield were worse than doing nothing
A Strategic Outline Business Case for the nearby Maid Marian Railway Line in Ashfield examined transport options across the wider corridor. Road improvements to the A38 in that area were assessed as performing worse than the do-nothing scenario — meaning building the road was judged to deliver less value than doing nothing at all. There has never been any transport option assessment for the A38 Derby corridor.
The A38 through Derby was incrementally dualled between the late 1950s and early 1980s. By 2001, demand had grown and a further expansion was being considered, but only a road-based study was commissioned, not a multi-modal one.
When asked by the examining authority why no alternatives were considered, National Highways confirmed the solution was predetermined as road-based from the outset in 2001.
That single decision, made 25 years ago, continues to drive a £600m infrastructure commitment in 2026.
No active travel, public transport or demand management alternatives have ever been formally assessed.
Local media is starting to ask questions
Derby Telegraph journalist Zena Hawley — historically supportive of the scheme — published a piece questioning whether it will work and whether it represents value for money. Opinion is shifting as the true picture becomes clearer: https://www.derbytelegraph.co.uk/news/derby-news/frankly-struggle-believe-a38-derby-10897786
THIS CAN BE STOPPED
This scheme was supposed to start construction in 2021 and finish by 2024. Our collective efforts have kept the bulldozers away.
Construction is not now due until 2030
The A1 Northumberland dualling was cancelled when costs doubled and the economic case collapsed — road schemes can be stopped
The Stonehenge tunnel was cancelled
The evidence against the A38 has never been stronger